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STATUTORY STRICT LIABILITY FOR AN INSURER'S
FAILURE TO SETTLE: A BALANCED PLAN
FOR AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ*
INTRODUCTION
Every time a liability insurance policyholder causes an accident,
he has a potential legal battle, not only with the party he injured, but
also with his liability insurance company. This occurs most often when
the insurance company declines an offer of settlement within the
amount of the insured's liability insurance policy and, subsequently, a
verdict is rendered against the insured for an amount in excess of his
liability insurance coverage.'
The insured may be able to recover this excess in a suit against
his insurance company because the liability insurance company im-
properly represented his interest: in deciding "not to settle," it placed
its own interests above that of its client.2 In determining when the in-
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1. See, e.g., Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
HARv. L. REv. 1136 (1954); Smith, The Miscegenetic Union of Liability Insurance and
Tort Process in the Personal Injury Claims System, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 645 (1969);
Snow, Excess Liability-Crisci & Lysick, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 51 (1969); 23 U. FLA.
L. REv. 201 (1970). See also Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E.
622 (1914), where it was first recognized, by implication, that a conflict of interests
existed between insurer and insured when a settlement offer within policy limits is re-
fused. Until that time, courts had interpreted companies' "right" to settle literally.
2. See, e.g., Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 240-41, 104 N.E. 622,
624 (1914):
mhe true measure of the rights of the plaintiff [insured] on the one hand
and of the obligations of the defendant [insurance] company on the other is
not otbe found in the letter of the contract of insurance. That contract, by
its very terms, was designed to exclude any such liability. But there is a con-
tractual obligation of universal force which underlies all written agreements.
It is the obligation of good faith in carrying out what is written. The defend-
ant's failure to observe this requirement. . .is the thing upon which its liabil-
ity may safely be predicated.
Snow, supra note 1, at 51-54; Annot, 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
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surance company should pay this excess judgment, a number of courts
have resorted to a subjective standard and deemed the insurance com-
pany liable only when it has exercised "bad faith" in failing to settle.3
Other courts have predicated liability on a general negligence stand-
ard. Finally, at least two courts have proposed that liability insurance
companies might be deemed strictly liable when their failure to settle
has resulted in an excess judgment against their insured, but these deci-
sions have not provided a developed rationale for their suggestion.5
None of the approaches utilized by courts has met with a great
deal of approvalY Both the "good faith" and "negligence" standards
have failed to provide meaningful predictability that is so necessary in
3. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 7.8(b), at 510 (1971). See
Board of Educ. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 293 F. Supp. 541 (D.NJ. 1968), aff'd
per curiam, 419 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1969); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App.
2d 679, 689, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1957) (list of factors involved in "good faith"); Koppie
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973); Lange v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
290 Minn. 61, 185 N.W.2d 881 (1971); Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 NJ. 62,
237 A.2d 857 (1968); Crabb v. National Indem. Co., 205 N.W.2d 633 (S.D. 1973);
Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, §§ 4-5 at 178-83 (1955).
4. R. KEETON, supra note 3, § 7.8(b), at 510. See American Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Shook, 247 Ark. 1082, 449 S.W.2d 402 (1970); Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 111 N.H. 43, 274 A.2d 781 (1971); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, § 7, at 186-
90 (1955).
Although bad faith and negligence standards are nominally distinct, the two tend
to coalesce in practice. See, e.g., Hills & Pivnicka, Development and Direction of the
California Bad Faith Insurance Doctrine or "0 Ye of Little Faith," 8 U.S.F. L. Rv.
29 (1973); Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 13
VAND. L. REv. 837, 851-53 (1960); Comment, Approaching Strict Liability of Insurer
for Refusing to Settle Within Policy Limits, 47 NEB. L. REv. 705, 714-17 (1968); Com-
ment, Insurer's Liability in Excess of Policy Limits, 15 S.D.L. RPv. 143, 151-53 (1970);
Note, Liability Insurance-The Movable Link Between Coverage Denial and Settlement
Offers, 52 N.C.L. REV. 703 (1974).
5. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 17 (1967); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 NJ. 474,
501-02, 323 A.2d 495, 510 (1974).
6. Huttenbrauck, Effect of Insured's Bad Faith Refusal to Settle on Insurer's Lia-
bility for Excess Judgment, 7 THE FoRum 61, 63 (1972); Comment, Applying the Bad
Faith Doctrine to the Primary and Excess Insurance Carrier Relationship in California,
7 LOYOLA L.A.L. Rnv. 277 (1974); Comment, Insurance-Liability of Insurer for Judg-
ment in Excess of Policy Limits, 48 MicH. L. Rnv. 95, 100-03 (1949). See, e.g., Slater
v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 152, 187 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1962) (insurance
company's behavior characterized as "arbitrary and a display of poor judgment," but not
bad faith); Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. LJ.
100 (1938) (judged negligence and bad faith standards acceptable in theory, but un-
workable in practice). Appleman characterized "a group of laymen casually assembled"
as "absolutely incompetent" to apply either test accurately. Id. at 111. Even those who
disagree must recognize that juries may be prone to direct their sympathies toward vul-
nerable insureds. Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 INS.
COUNSEL J. 58, 62 (1961).
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this area. It is very difficult for the insurance company to know
whether or not its failure to settle may subject it to future liability
against the insured. Thus, it cannot make an accurate determination
of the premium on the policies it issues.
The uncertainties involved are equally serious for the insured.
He could have avoided personal payment in regard to the tort claim
lodged against him "if only" his insurer had accepted the offer of
settlement. Now he must absorb what is often a substantial incursion
into his assets-savings, car or home-in order to pay off the tort
claim.7 He may attempt to place this loss on his insurance company,
but there are serious obstacles in his way.
He must find an attorney to take his case. This may not be an
easy task. These suits are most unpopular ones with insurance com-
panies, and members of the plaintiff's bar who must deal in a satisfac-
tory manner with that class of defendants every working day may be
reluctant to take such cases. Even if the attorney is willing to "go
after" the insurance company, the economics of the case may make
him reluctant to proceed because recovery is uncertain. In that regard,
the attorney's hesitancy may be increased because of the substantial
costs of experts and personal time involved in a case of this type.'
If the insurance companies were made strictly liable for their fail-
ure to settle, this would allow for a greater degree of prediction for
both the insurer and the insured. Nevertheless, a carefully articulated
rationale must be provided for the imposition of strict liability. Also,
strict liability has the unfortunate potential of subjecting liability insur-
ance companies to extraordinarily high costs and causing the price of
liability insurance to rise. The result may be that fewer and fewer in-
dividuals will purchase it. This is an unhappy consequence, assuming
that our society wishes to achieve the goal of spreading the cost of
accidents in a fair and reasonable manner.
Legal problems relating to failure to settle not only adversely af-
fect insurance companies and their insureds. Recently some courts
have held that liability insurance company attorneys may also be sub-
ject to a successful malpractice charge by policyholders when the at-
torney has placed the company's interest above that of the liability in-
surance holder. This has placed insurance company attorneys in a
7. For a detailed account of the serious personal consequence that can befall an
insured in this situation, see Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
8. Cf. J. O'CoNNELL, ENDINo INSULT TO INJuRY 18-19 (1975) (cost of experts in
products liability cases).
9. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Ivy
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highly precarious position. When should they withdraw from the case?
Can they ever serve both the insured and the insurance company simul-
taneously once an offer of settlement has been tendered?
Is there a viable solution to the problem of allocating costs when
an insurance company's judgment in failing to settle proves to be
wrong? Can this solution end the conflict of interest dilemma that in-
surance company attorneys who defend policyholders face daily?
Some fresh thinking is called for; hopefully, it will be provided herein.
I. THE INSURANCE COMPANY ATTORNEY WITHDRAWS FROM
REPRESENTING THE INSURED-A SOLUTION?
One solution to the problem has been suggested by the American
Bar Association: provide that the insurance company attorney advise
the insured of the conflict of interest as soon as it arises and withdraw
from representing the insured if it becomes apparent that there is an
actual conflict of interest."0 While this approach may be the only
viable solution when the conflict of interest is based on the fact that
the insurance company is on "both sides" of the same case," or when
it is in dispute with the policyholder as to "coverage,"' 2 it is not very
promising in cases where a conflict of interest brises out of a refusal
by the insurance company to settle. In that regard, if the insurance
company attorney withdraws from representation, who is to represent
the insured in the liability case against him? An attorney recom-
mended by the insurance company may not have the degree of inde-
pendence that is required in this situation. More importantly, the in-
sured must pay independent defense counsel and this cost will be sub-
stantial. The insured is unlikely to accept the insurance company's
offer to withdraw when he is not in a position to pay an attorney. On
the other hand, it is unreasonable to compel the insurance company
v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1958); Annot., 28
A.L.R.3d 389, 396-97 (1969); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 835, 848-49 (1968).
10. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSInILITY, CANON 5; AMERICAN BAR AS-
SOCIArION STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLES, LIABILnY INSURERS IV (1972).
1I. This can occur when, for instance, both drivers in an automobile accident are
insured by the same insurer. See generally R. KEETON, supra note 3, § 7.7(a) (1971).
12. For example, the insured may contend that his liability, if any, is in negligence,
while the insurance company could allege noncoverage because the insured committed
an intentional tort. See Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 254 Ore. 496, 460 P.2d
342 (1969) (insurer has duty to defend when complaint on one count falls within cover-
age); Aim v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 369 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 1962) (insurer has duty to
defend when complaint alleged potential coverage); Newcomb v. Meiss, 263 Minn. 315,
116 N.W.2d 593 (1962) (in negligence action not error to refuse request of insurance
company counsel to submit issue of intentional tort to jury).
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to pay for independent counsel every time a potential conflict of inter-
est arises with its insured.
A final problem with the ABA proposal is that it puts a great deal
of pressure on insurance company counsel to correctly judge when a
potential conflict of interest arises. There 'are many times when insur-
ance company counsel believes that it is in the best interest of the in-
sured not to settle. In that regard, if the case is one in which the in-
sured is not liable, why should a large settlement be made with the
almost certain result that the insured's liability insurance premiums will
be raised?
In sum, the "attorney-withdrawal" approach is not a sound solu-
tion to the problem that arises when a liability insurance company fails
to settle within policy limits and the insured, subsequently, suffers a
judgment in excess of those limits.
]1. STRICT LIABILITY UNDER CASE LAW
DEVELOPMENT-A SOLUTION?
At first blush, strict products liability cases' 3 and Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts14 would not seem to be sources of
law for plaintiff-insureds who seek damages from their liability insur-
ance companies because of their failure to settle within policy limits.
These legal resources deal with sellers of chattels, and it would not be
realistic to deem an insurance policy a chattel.' 5 In effect, although
liability insurance is embodied in a document, it is a service that is be-
ing provided to policyholders. While some products liability cases have
13. See, e.g., C.C. Hooper Cafe Co. v. Henderson, 223 Ala. 579, 137 So. 419
(1931) (liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by food or food products
sold); Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956)
(automobiles or other vehicles, and their parts, supplies, and equipment); Cordell v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 56 Ga. App. 117, 192 S.E. 228 (1937) (beverages); Hender-
son v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 23 A.2d 743 (1942) (drugs or medicines); Coca
Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Crow, 200 Tenn. 161, 291 S.W.2d 589 (1956) (containers
or packages).
14. This section reads as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965).
15. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 5, 6, 59 (2d ed. 1955).
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extended their reach to services, a tangible chattel has played an essen-
tial part in the transaction and has been a substantial cause of the physi-
cal harm suffered by the plaintiff.16
Nevertheless, if one reaches below the surface to the reasons that
underlie Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
cases that have imposed strict liability on sellers of products, one finds
a more fertile resource for the imposition of that very same liability
on liability insurance companies when their failure to settle has cost
a policyholder money.
First, strict liability has been imposed on manufacturers of prod-
ucts because negligence law was found to be an insufficient incentive
to compel manufacturers to make products safe.17 The same situation
apparently exists with regard to liability insurance companies. While
there are numerous cases each year where plaintiff-insureds prevail
against liability insurance companies and prove that they have exer-
cised "bad faith" or that they were negligent in failing to settle,' 8 there
are also many where plaintiff is unable to do so.' 9 Under the "bad
16. See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton, 85 N.M. 679, 515 P.2d 1283 (1973) (re-
pair of automobile wheel); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697
(1969) (application of permanent wave solution); Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4
Wash. App. 439, 481 P.2d 924 (1971) (application of permanent wave solution). But
see Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d
316 (Ct. App. 1972) (sale of electrical service).
17. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 391, 161 A.2d 69, 87
(1960); W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 97, at 650 (4th ed. 1971). Contra, Plant,
Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-Ain Oppos-
lng View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 945 (1957).
18. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 3 & 4 supra; Keeton, supra note 1, at 1139-40 rm.
6-8. See also Snow, supra note 1, at 52.
19. Hodges v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1961) (refusal to settle $50,000 suit within $10,000 policy limits did not render in-
surance company liable for $27,000 judgment); Kohlstedt v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
258 Iowa 337, 139 N.W.2d 184 (1965) (refusal to settle $100,000 suit within $15,000
policy limits was not bad faith establishing liability for $25,000 verdict); Ferris v. Em-
ployers Mut. Cas. Co., 255 Iowa 511, 122 N.W.2d 263 (1963) (failure to settle within
$10,000 policy, resulting in $55,000 judgment against insured, did not make insurance
company liable for difference); Peterson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Minn.
482, 160 N.W.2d 541 (1968) ($125,000 suit, $35,500 recovery; policy $10,000; failure
to settle did not lead to liability for excess over policy amount); Gordon v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 931 (1973) (failure to settle within $20,000 policy because of erroneous belief
that policy was cancelled would not involve bad faith rendering company liable for
$259,000 judgment); Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223
(1957) (no liability for $45,000 excess judgment when company refused to contribute
policy limit toward settlement in which insured was prepared to join); Alford v. Na-
tional Emblem Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 379, 469 S.W.2d 375 (1971) (failure of insurance
company attorney to interview investigating officer about insured's accident or to make
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faith" and negligence standards, insurance companies apparently be-
lieve that it is a worthwhile risk to gamble. Moreover, to a great ex-
tent, they may gamble with the insured's money. For example, sup-
pose the insured has an automobile liability insurance policy with a
$20,000 maximum coverage per accident. The possible liability ex-
posure of the insured is $100,000, but there is a potentially good as-
sumption of risk defense. If an offer is made to settle at $20,000,
the insurance company can refuse it and gamble with $80,000 of the
insured's assets.2°
Second, and more importantly, strict liability has been imposed
upon manufacturers of products because they impliedly represent or
warrant that the product is reasonably fit for its intended use.21 The
purchaser of liability insurance with a $20,000 limitation stands in a
situation quite analogous to the purchaser of a product: he expects to
be safeguarded against any tort claim that is made for less than that
amount.22 When there has been a refusal to settle within policy limits
effort to settle within policy limits not bad faith); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 206
Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966) (insurance company which carefully investigated and
then refused to settle malpractice case within policy limits not liable for $50,000 excess
judgment).
20. The incentive to take such risks naturally increases as settlement offers approach
policy limits, even though the insured has nothing to gain and may well lose by litiga-
tion. Insurance companies should, therefore, be willing to assume the burden as well
as the benefits of a decision to litigate rather than settle. See Smith, supra note 1, at
700; Comment, Applying the Bad Faith Doctrine, supra note 6, at 284-85; Comment,
Insurance, supra note 6, at 101-02; Comment, Insurer's Liability, supra note 4, at 154;
Note, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18
StAr. L. Ruv. 475, 482-85 (1966); 13 U. Cm. L. Rv. 105 (1945); Note, Insurer's Refu-
sal to Settle-A Proposal for Imposition of Liability Above Policy Limits, 60 YALE LJ.
1037 (1951).
The insured has nothing to gain from a trial if he could be protected from personal
liability by a settlement, with two qualifications. First, he may gain if he is found not
liable, since his premiums will probably rise in the event he is adjudged liable or the
case is settled, though the increase in premiums would generally be less than the possi-
ble judgment against him. Second, the insured may want a trial in order to vindicate
himself-he may want the chance to prove his case.
21. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 384-85, 161 A.2d 69,
83-84 (1960); W. PRossmi, supra note 17, § 97, at 651 (4th ed. 1971).
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to
be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has un-dertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the con-
suming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to anddoes expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced
to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods ....
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) op ToRrs § 402A, comment c (1965).
22. Under this view, an ultimate result of strict liability would be to afford a type
of coverage which the insured would probably prefer, and one which he may even feel
he is buying already, "but which he is far too weak to obtain by bargaining." Comment,
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and a subsequent judgment in excess of that limitation, the buyer's
common sense expectation has been thwarted.
Courts have recognized the fact that insureds believe "that a sum
of money equal to the limits [of the policy] is available and will be
used so as to avoid liability on [the insured's] part with regard to any
covered accident. '23  Thus, a number of jurisdictions have imple-
mented this expectation through the use of "presumptions" that deem
the insurer's failure to foresee an excess recovery as prima facie evi-
dence of its negligence in refusing to settle. 4  Actually, these courts
are only giving lip service to the fault system. In the glare of hindsight,
the fact that a claimant has won an excess judgment should not in and
of itself be evidence that the insurer was negligent in refusing to settle.
Nevertheless, these courts are pressed into that position because they
want to fulfill what they believe to be the reasonable expectations of
the consumer.25
Finally, strict liability is imposed on manufacturers of products be-
cause they are in a good position (especially as compared with pur-
Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurers' Failure to Settle: A Move Toward Ra-
tional Settlement Behavior, 43 WAsH. L. R.v. 799, 816 (1963).
23. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 17 (1967); accord, Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America,
65 N.J. 474, 501-02, 323 A.2d 495, 510 (1974). See also Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life
Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403-04, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970); Reichert v. General
Ins. Co., 68 Cal. 2d 822, 849, 442 P.2d 377, 393, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 337 (1968) (dis-
sent; 4-3 decision).
The quasi-public nature of the insurance industry, along with the adhesive character
of much of the dealing between insured and insurer, has led courts to give special weight
to the reasonable expectations of the public and to the type of service the insurance com-
pany holds itself out as offering. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal.
2d 659, 668 n.5, 456 P.2d 674, 680-81 n.5, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112-13 n.5 (1969); Note,
Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Co., 25 HASTINGS L. 699, 707-08 (1974).
24. See, e.g., Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 305-06,
157 A.2d 319, 323 (1960). The argument is that the fact of the excess judgment in
itself invites the inference that the refusal to settle was unreasonable. Comment, Ap-
proaching Strict Liability, supra note 4, at 720. Strictly speaking, of course, it supports
only the inference that the judgment was wrong, not the inference that it was unreason-
able or negligent.
25. Strict liability would be a more straightforward method of fulfilling the insured's
expectations. Further, courts could then make it absolutely clear that the duty was im-
posed by law and could not be avoided by contract except under certain circumstances;
note that the proposed statute does allow an insurer to avoid this liability on contracts
sold at a reduced premium. General Regulation Article, § 4. This would parallel prod-
ucts liability, where a seller is not allowed to disclaim, dilute, or alter by contract the
duty which the law imposes on him. See, e.g., Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp.
427, 431 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Dart Equip. Corp. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d
837, 849, 88 Cal. Rptr. 670, 678 (1970).
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chasers) to distribute the costs of the accident.2 6 Liability insurance
companies are also in that position. They can make a reasonably ac-
curate estimate of the cost of "excess judgments" and distribute that
cost through the price of liability insurance policies.2 7
Although it can be seen that all the important policies underly-
ing strict liability in regard to manufacturers of products are at least
equally applicable to liability insurance companies, it may be objected
that the application of strict liability to any pure service is a dangerous
precedent which could lead to a subjection of all services to the same
standard. 8
This is an unreasonable concern. The reliance that the consumer-
insureds place on being protected from liability up to the limits of their
policies is almost unique. With respect to most other services, the con-
sumer only anticipates "reasonable care." More importantly, sellers of
insurance policies are in a much better position to distribute costs of
potentially increased liability on a widespread basis than sellers of other
services; they are a service that deals with hundreds of thousands and
sometimes millions of customers.29  Finally, the insurance company's
26. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, Tn L Aw ox? TORTS § 28.19, at 1576 (1956); W.
PRoSSER, supra note 17, § 75, at 494 (4th ed. 1971).
[Plublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by prod-
ucts intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be ob-
tained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of
protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are
those who market the products. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A,
comment c (1965).
But see Plant, supra note 17, at 945-48.
27. See Comment, supra note 22, at 806.
28. Even courts most favorably disposed to strict liability have shied away from the
concept when professional services are involved. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal.
App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Magrine v. Spector, 53 NJ. 259, 250 A.2d 129
(1969); 41 TENNr. L. RV. 392, 396-99 (1974). See generally Farnsworth, Implied
Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 653 (1957); Note,
Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction,
24 HAST S L.J. 111 (1972); Note, The Application of Implied Warranties to Pre-
dominantly "Service" Transactions, 31 Omo ST. L.J. 580 (1970). But cf. Johnson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (on defendant's motion to
dismiss, held public policy does not require as a matter of law that mechanical and ad-
ministrative services provided by hospitals be exempt from strict liability); St. Johnsbury
& Lamoille County R.R. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 341 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Vt. 1972), afffd,
469 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1972) (dictum expressed readiness to extend strict liability to
a pure service contract if given an "appropriate" case); Hoffmann v. Misericordia Hosp.,
439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970) (on defendant hospital's demurrer, held that even
if giving blood seen as a service, hospital might be liable for breach of warranty).
29. Even if higher premiums were to result, they would be borne by the class di-
rectly benefited-the policyholders-and would also be consistent with public policy fa-
voring greater distribution of risks. See Note, An Insurance Company's Duty to Set-
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misjudgments in these matters can be distinguished from those made
by most other services: the company had a full and ample time period
to provide its insured full protection and consciously decided not to pro-
vide it.30
The benefits that will be derived from the imposition of strict lia-
bility are clear. Thus, in the event of an accidental loss accompanied
by a settlement within policy limits, insureds will be protected against
serious and substantial economic injury as well as from the mental suf-
fering that occurs when the insurance company has "guessed wrong."31
The imposition of strict liability will provide an additional benefit:
it will remove one of the most significant thorns of potential "conflict
of interest" from the side of the legal profession.32 In that connection,
insurance company counsel will no longer be torn between his obliga-
tion to his employer and his "client for the case" when there is a deci-
sion to decline an offer of settlement. He can simply exercise his best
judgment from the vantage point of the insurance company. His other
"client" will be protected in case that judgment is wrong.
Finally, while the overriding imposition of strict liability may in-
crease costs of insurance simply because the companies may have to
"pay out more," it may also result in some savings. First, the insurance
companies will be operating under clear and predictable rules. This
will reduce or eliminate costly litigation over "excess liability cover-
age." Also, the insurance company will avoid being subject to liability
for infliction of emotional harm or for punitive damages because of its
failure to settle. Since the insured will know that he will be protected
from excess liability and the duty on the insurance company will be
clear, damages of either kind will be unlikely to arise. As some recent
tie: Qualified or Absolute?, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 120, 139 (1968); 13 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
105, 110 (1945).
30. In effect, the insurer has taken a risk by its own choice. Under products liabil-
ity, a beer bottler is liable for exploding bottles no matter how careful he was; a forti-
ori he would be liable if he knew that a specific bottle might explode but nevertheless
chose to sell it and hope for the best.
31. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967); cf. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) ("out-
rageous conduct" by life insurance company in denying liability to beneficiary); Gruen-
berg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973)
(breach of good faith by fire insurance company to policyholder supports damages for
mental distress); Fletcher v. Western Nat' Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1970) ("outrageous conduct" by disability insurer supports damages for emo-
tional distress).
32. See, e.g., R. KEnTON, supra note 3, § 7.7a (1971); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 389,
396 (1969).
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verdicts indicate, damages for "emotional harm7 s3 or punitive dam-
ages34 can be quite substantial.
Although common law strict liability represents an improvement
over either a negligence or good faith basis for imposing liability when
an insurer has failed to settle within policy limits and an excess judg-
ment has been rendered against its insured, it is not the best way to
resolve the matter.3 5 There is a danger of judicial overkill in the appli-
cation of strict liability for insurance companies' failure to settle: courts
may require the company to initiate settlement discussions or hold it
responsible for damages that an insured would clearly be unable to
pay- 6 More importantly, a strict liability system developed by case law
will fail to provide the predictability that is of vital concern to both the
insurer and the insured.37 A system that is fair to all parties therefore
must be based on legislation. That legislation must attempt to balance
the needs of the insurer and the insured, be practical in design, and
resolve the major dilemmas that have confronted courts for too many
years.
Il. STATUTORY STRICT LIABILITY: A SOLUTION.
A proposed statute is offered in the Appendix to this Article in
order to provide state legislatures with a starting point for resolving
33. See cases cited in note 31 supra. See also Parks, IV, Heil, Insurers Beware:
"Bad Faith" Is in Full Bloom, 9 FoRUM 63 (1973); Comment, 47 NEn. L. Rnv., supra
note 4, at 720; Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers. Recent De-
velopments in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1303 (1973).
It has even been suggested that an insured in an excess judgment situation should
be allowed to assign his claims to plaintiff, relieve himself of further liability, and still
sue separately for mental and emotional damages. Comment, Wrongful Failure to Settle
an Insurance Claim: The Case of the Missing Cause of Action, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1408 (1973).
34. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968).
35. To date only two courts, in dictum, have indicated that they might shift to a
strict liability basis. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430-31, 426 P.2d 173,
177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65
N.J. 474, 500-02, 323 A.2d 495, 509-10 (1974). Seven years after the Crisci dictum
was handed down, Rova Farms characterized strict liability as having been "regarded
favorably by some," but the court went no further than to admit "the probability or the
possibility" of future judicial adoption of the rule.
36. Cf. Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 22 Utah 2d 187, 450 P.2d 460 (1969).
37. Appraising the California experience with bad faith, one writer said that "al-
most every other action filed on a property insurance claim now includes a prayer for
damages in excess of policy limits." Bogert, Liability of Insurers in California Beyond
Policy Limits, 1973 INs. LJ. 381, 382 (1973). Precise regulation of recovery in such
actions would have a substantial impact on the industry. Also, since today's judicial
standards often amount to the functional equivalent of strict liability, the number of suc-
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when a liability insurance company should be liable to its insured for
its failure to settle a claim. For the reasons set forth in Part II of this
Article, strict liability has been selected as the basis for insurance com-
panies' liability. Nevertheless, every reasonable attempt is made to
limit that liability to situations where it is absolutely necessary to im-
pose it.
The statute makes it clear that liability insurance must protect an
insured when the insurance company declines an "offer of settlement'
and there is a subsequent judgment against the insured above the limits
of the liability insurance policy. This obligation is embodied in the
first section of the General Regulations Article of the proposed statute.
The statute defines what an "offer of settlement" is for this pur-
pose in section 2 of the General Regulations Article. Several questions
are resolved. For example, the offer need not be tendered in writing
-it may be conveyed orally by plaintiffs attorney. This approach was
taken because most offers of settlement are made on the telephone or
in face to face meetings; thus, too many offers would be eliminated
if they were required to be in written form. The principal argument
for requiring that the offer be made in writing would be to avoid fraud-
ulent claims. The possibility of fraud by an injured plaintiff's counsel
seems remote. Moreover, counsel would have little to gain by making
such a fraudulent claim because under the proposed system the in-
surer would be liable for an excess judgment only when the insured
would, in fact, be able to pay the claim.38  The more serious threat
is that of fraud by an insured who falsely alleges that the insurer re-
fused an oral offer to settle; nevertheless, an insured is unlikely to be
able to manufacture substantial proof of that kind. In sum, the possi-
bilities of fraud are not so great as to justify a loophole allowing insur-
ers to refuse any oral offer with impunity.
The primary purpose of the statute is to protect the insured from
the insurer's decision not to settle. Thus, if the insured concurs in that
decision for his own reasons, then the arguments for protecting him
evaporate. The statute requires that in order for an insured to waive
his rights once there has been an offer to settle, he must reject the
settlement affirmatively and in writing. This requirement will reduce
the problems of proving rejection, and provide some protection against
pressure exerted by the insurer.
cessful recoveries against insurance companies should not increase drastically. See
Snow, supra note 1, at 54; Note, Excess Liability, supra note 20, at 484; 23 U. FLA.
L. REv. 201 (1970).
38. See text accompanying note 39 infra.
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Should there be an obligation on the insurance company to initi-
ate settlement? There is a temptation to require the insurer to make an
attempt to settle a dispute, because this duty might facilitate early res-
olution of claims and provide additional protection for an insured.
The benefits, however, would come at too high a price. Two of the
principal dividends of a statutory system for the handling of excess li-
ability claims are a predictable standard that will keep disputes about
failure to settle out of the courts and the avoidance of conflict-of-in-
terest problems for insurance company attorneys. If an obligation
were placed on the insurance company to initiate settlement, both
benefits would be compromised. For example, the duty to initiate
settlement would have to be phrased in terms of a "reasonable effort."
One can readily foresee that there would be litigation as to whether
a "reasonable effort" was made and that the insurance company attor-
ney would again be placed in a conflict-of-interest position. In sum,
many of the vexing problems that have plagued the courts with the
good faith and negligence standards would return in a new form if an
insurance company had a duty to initiate settlement.
The statute specifies the amount of money the liability insurance
company becomes responsible to pay when an excess judgment has
been rendered against its insured. Two basic alternatives are the
amount of the final judgment or the amount the insured could actually
pay. This author would limit the responsibility of the insurance com-
pany to the amount that a successful plaintiff "would have been able
to recover from the insured," 39 and the statute so provides in section
3 of the General Regulations Article.40  In order to implement that
rule, the state Insurance Commissioner would be authorized to estab-
lish an administrative procedure which would determine whether the
39. Cf. Shapiro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1971).
See generally R. KIETON, supra note 3, § 7.8(f), at 516-20, agreeing with this conclu-
sion. Professor Keeton gives as one of his reasons for this conclusion the fact that the
plaintiff offered to settle for the lesser amount, and therefore has in a sense benefited
from the refusal to settle since he now has a judgment for more than what he offered to
accept. Id. at 517. This is true, but subject to a significant qualification: the judgment
today may be worth less than the settlement was when it was offered for two reasons.
First, the judgment is not money, but only a right to get money, and therefore may be of
less value than the offered settlement would have been if paid. Second, the plaintiff, in
order to get the judgment, has had to wait, losing the use of money, and has incurred
expenses-the attorney's contingent fee alone may reduce an apparently generous judg-
ment to a sum less than the offered settlement. See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 627
(1975).
40. While it is true that section 5 makes the judgment collectible as soon as it be-
comes final, the amount collectible is limited by section 3 to the amount that could be
collected from the insured.
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insured could now, or in tie immediate future, pay the excess. The
commissioner's authority to proceed is also set forth in section 3.
It might be argued that this rule is unfair to the injured plaintiff
since he may be denied the benefit of his full jury award; however, this
argument does not withstand close analysis. The insurance company's
responsibility to pay a judgment in excess of the policy limits arises
out of a duty to indemnify its insured for its failure to accept an offer
to settle and not out of any duty to the plaintiff who suffered an injury.
In any case, the plaintiff is denied nothing by this rule, since the
amount recoverable is defined in section 3A of the General Regula-
tions Article as the insurance policy limits plus so much of the in-
sured's assets as would be subject to judicial process; that is the
most the plaintiff could recover from the insured without the statute.
The statutory system could also resolve another problem that has
troubled courts recently: it can specify the extent of the insurer's obli-
gation toward its insured when there has been an offer to settle in
excess of the limits of the policy.41 In that situation, the insurer
should notify the insured of the existence and amount of the offer. If
the insured indicates in writing that he is willing and able to supply
the funds in excess of the policy limit that are necessary to settle the
claim, he should then have the benefit of placing the risks of a refusal
to settle on the insurance company. For example, if the policy limit
is $10,000 and there is an offer to settle for $12,000, then the insur-
ance company should inform the insured of the offer and give him an
opportunity to contribute $2,000. If he does make the contribution,
then the insurance company can settle for $10,000, the policy limit;
if it refuses to do so, it should be required to pay any judgment in ex-
cess of the policy limit. Once the insured offers to contribute enough
for the insurer to settle at the policy limit, the situation is indistinguish-
able from one in which the plaintiff offers to settle at the policy limit.
If the insurer prefers to gamble, it should do so at its own risk. This
approach follows from the basic strict liability system set forth in the
statute, and will provide both the insurer and the insured a clear under-
standing of their respective responsibilities in the situation. The sug-
gested approach to this problem is set forth in section 2 of the General
Regulations Article of the proposed statute.
Another issue for statutory resolution is that of who may enforce
the insurer's liability for the excess judgment.42 Although the liability
41. Cf. Brochstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 987, 989-90 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972) (failure to inform the insured that a settlement
might be possible if he will contribute toward it may show bad faith).
42. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 677 (1975).
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arises out of a duty to the insured, and not to the injured plaintiff, the
best rule would be to allow either the insured or the plaintiff to en-
force it. The advantage of allowing the plaintiff to enforce it is effi-
ciency: there is no point in requiring a suit against the insured for fail-
ure to pay a judgment. The advantage of permitting the insured to
enforce it is protection: the insured must have some recourse if the
plaintiff chooses to enforce his judgment against the insured's assets.
The proposed statute deals with this issue in section 5 of the General
Regulations Article.
There are many other matters that could be resolved in a statuto-
ry strict liability scheme. A carefully conducted, thorough legislative
hearing on the matter has a greater potential than case law for bring-
ing the important issues to light and resolving them in a proper man-
ner. The legislative system certainly could avoid many of the untoward
consequences that might arise from common law application of strict
liability. Thus, if the "offer of settlement" procedure is carefully
spelled out in the legislation, insureds would not be tempted to obtain
insurance with low liability limits in the hope that they will be protect-
ed by strict liability for excess judgments. The insurance seller can de-
monstrate to the buyer that if his protection has too low a limit, there
will be little likelihood of an offer of settlement within the policy
limits in case of a serious accident.
Finally, the legislature can utilize options that may be impossible
or extremely difficult to develop by common law decision. For exam-
ple, a statute could set forth when and under what conditions a liabili-
ty insurance company might be entitled to contract out of its responsi-
bility for excess judgments based on failure to settle.43  An approach
to this problem is set forth in section 4 of the General Regulations Ar-
ticle of the proposed statute.
CONCLUSION
Current legal approaches to the problem of harm caused by an
insurance company's failure to settle have left those companies, their
attorneys, and policyholders uncomfortable and uncertain. The ap-
plication of strict liability to such situations can be supported by reason
and policy. Nevertheless, if strict liability is painted with too broad
43. A broad analogy may be provided by workmen's compensation statutes that pro-
vide procedures by which an employee can elect to pursue a common law, third party
suit. See, Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1023 (Supp. 1974); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §
81-13-8 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 2363 (Supp. 1970); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 152; § 15 (Supp. 1974).
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a brush, as it might be if left to common law development, it may im-
pose unreasonable costs on the insurance companies and on the price
of insurance itself. Also, case law development of the strict liability
doctrine will not provide the certainty that is of paramount importance
in this area. On the other hand, a system of statutory strict liability
can provide that predictability and protect the insured while avoiding
overkill against liability insurance companies. This is a solvable prob-
lem that has plagued insurance companies, their attorneys, and policy-
holders for too long. It is time for state legislatures to act.
INSURER'S STRICT LIABILITY
APPENDIX
Proposed Statute
STATE INSURANCE CODE
GENERAL SECTION-LIABILITY INSURANCE
SUB-SECTION-GENERAL REGULATIONS
ARTICLE No. 001. FAILURE TO SETTLE BY AN INSURER:
GENERAL REGULATIONS
1. Strict Liability for Failure to Settle. When an insurer rejects
an offer of settlement of a tort claim brought against its insured that
is within the subject matter coverage and liability limits of its insurance
contract, and a subsequent final judgment is entered against the in-
sured in favor of the offering party that is in excess of the amount of
such liability limits, the insurer must pay such offering party the amount
that such offering party would have been able to recover from the in-
sured. Such amount shall be determined pursuant to the procedure
set forth in section 3 below.
2. Offer of Settlement. In order to constitute an offer of settle-
ment for purposes of section 1 above, the offer must be tendered oral-
ly or in writing by the claimant or his attorney or authorized repre-
sentative to the insurer or its attorney or authorized representative.
Any such offer of settlement must be communicated by the insurer to
its insured within one week from the date it is received by the insurer.
If the insured rejects the offer in writing, the insurer shall have no lia-
bility as set forth in section 1 above. If the amount of the offer of set-
tlement is equal to or less than the liability limits of the insurance con-
tract, and the insurer rejects the offer of settlement, then the insurer
shall be liable as set forth in section 1 above. If the amount of the of-
fer of settlement is more than the liability limits of the insurance con-
tract, the insured must be allowed to add his own funds to make up
the difference between the offer and the liability limits of the insurance
contract, in order to meet the offer; if the insured agrees to such addi-
tion in writing, and the insurer rejects the offer of settlement, the in-
surer shall be liable as set forth in section 1 above, but if the insured
does not so agree then the insurer shall not be liable under section
1.
3. Determination of Excess Liability.
A. When an insurer is liable for a judgment under section 1
above, the insurer shall pay the lesser of:
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(1) the entire judgment, or
(2) the sum of
a. the liability limits of the insurance contract, and
b. an amount equal to the value of so much of the in-
sured's net assets as are subject to legal process under the laws of this
state.
B. The Insurance Commissioner is empowered to determine
the amount that is recoverable for purposes of subparagraph A(2)
(b) above, and for that purpose is empowered to conduct hear-
ings pursuant to the applicable administrative procedure in this state,
and to appoint up to ( ) assistants with authority to conduct such
hearings.
C. Payment by the insurer of the amount described in subsec-
tion A, or of any lesser amount that relieves the insurer of further li-
ability (whether under a compromise agreement with the offering party,
now a judgment creditor, or otherwise), shall be deemed a full satis-
faction of the judgment by the insured for purposes of relieving the
insured of liability on the judgment.
4. Exemption from Strict Liability. An insurer, after clearly
and fully explaining in writing to a prospective insured the obligation
imposed upon the insurer by section 1 above, may offer to the pros-
pective insured an insurance contract exempting the insurer from the
provisions of this Article; provided, that any such contract shall be of-
fered at a discount from the otherwise applicable premium (or other
consideration paid to the insurer or by the insured). The reduction in
premium shall reflect the reduced exposure of the insurer, and the In-
surance Commissioner is authorized to establish the amount or pro-
portion of the reduction. If the insured purchases such a discounted
contract, the insurer shall be liable under section 1 of this Article only
if the insurer
a. fails to act in good faith with respect to the insured, or
b. fails to make a reasonable attempt to notify the insured of an
offer of settlement within one week of receiving it.
5. Payment Due. The liability, if any, of an insurer under this
Article arises when the judgment against the insured becomes final
and the amount of liability has been determined under section 3A,
and shall be enforced by any court of appropriate jurisdiction upon
petition of the insured or of the offering party now a judgment
creditor.
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SUB-SECTION-REQUIRED POLICY PROVISIONS
ARTICLE No. 001. FAILURE TO SETTLE BY AN INSURER:
REQUIRED POLICY PROVISIONS
A policy insuring against loss or damage resulting from liability
in tort for injury suffered by another person or damage to property
shall not be issued or delivered in this state or to a resident of this state
unless it contains either
(a) A provision that whenever an offer of settlement of a claim
against the insured within the subject matter coverage and liability
limits of the policy is tendered in accordance with Article No. 001 of
the General Regulations of the Insurance Code of this State and is re-
jected by the insurer, and a subsequent final judgment is entered
against the insured in favor of the offering party in excess of the
amount of such liability limits, the insurer will pay such offering party
the amount that such offering party would have been able to recover
from the insured, such amount to be determined in accordance with
Article No. 001 of the General Regulations of the Insurance Code of
this State; or
(b) A provision, set in conspicuous type at least as large as fol-
lows that IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SPECIAL DISCOUNT-
ED PREMIUM PAID FOR THIS POLICY, THE INSURER IS EX-
EMPT FROM THE OBLIGATION THAT WOULD OTHERWISE
BE IMPOSED ON IT BY LAW TO PROTECT THE INSURED
FROM AN OBLIGATION TO PAY A CLAIMANT AN AMOUNT
IN EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT OF THE POLICY LIMITS
WHEN THE INSURER HAS REJECTED AN OFFER OF SET-
TLEMENT FROM THE CLAIMANT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF
THE POLICY; INSTEAD THE INSURED WILL BE OBLIGAT-
ED TO PAY THE EXCESS AMOUNT UNLESS THE INSURER
HAS FAILED TO EXERCISE GOOD FAITH OR HAS FAILED
TO MAKE A REASONABLE ATTEMPT TO NOTIFY THE IN-
SURED OF AN OFFER OF SETTLEMENT.
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